The perils of ‘zero vision of suicide’ from an existential and a non-pathological perspective
The concept of self-death, conventionally termed suicide, has long been enshrouded in moral, legal, and theological judgment. In modern Western discourse, self-death is frequently medicalized, viewed as either a failure of preventive care or as a manifestation of hypothetical mental pathology, categorizing it as a problem to be solved by biomedical intervention. Policies aimed at eliminating self-death, often articulated in a ‘zero vision’ approach, are driven by an ethic of care, yet risk diminishing the central existential dimensions of the human condition: the ontological incompleteness, radical human freedom, and the inherent uncertainty of life. Acknowledging the nuanced nature of these choices, the perspective of epistemic anarchism furnishes an alternative by advocating for a plurality of frameworks. This pluralism rejects the reduction of self-death to a single explanatory model, instead recognizing it as a complexity of individual agency, existential decision-making, and the search for meaning in the awful silence of the universe. By valuing diverse understandings and epistemologies of self-death, and prioritizing respect for human autonomy over paternalistic intervention, this approach proposes a more culturally sensitive and humanizing vision of support services.
The question of self-death (suicide is the conventional use) has been one of the most contentious and complex issues in human existence. From moral, legal, and religious viewpoints, the act of ending one’s own life is often met with moral and theological condemnation, and in contemporary discourse, it has largely been medicalized as an unfortunate failure of medical preventive measures, or, as an effect of hypothetical mental pathology. Thus, it is rendered as an ipso facto medical problem within the zeitgeist of modern Western culture. As an extension, policies aimed at reducing self-deaths often work within a framework of "zero vision"—the goal of completely eradicating self-deaths. While such aspirations and visions are predicated on an ethic of care, they risk erasing the most essential dimensions of what it means to be human: the ontological incompleteness of existence, the radical freedom of humans, and the uncertainty that pervades life.
Ontological incompleteness
Human existence, by its very nature, is incomplete. We are born into a world that is fundamentally unstable and an ongoing process of creative formation and flux. Put differently, life is not a terminal fact due to the ontological openness of the future. That is, there are no future events, only the possibility or probability of such. We are peculiar beings for whom existence is something in need of determination. This perpetual thrust into new moments introduces the note of human freedom and decision-making.
In this sense, the radical decision to end one’s own life is not just a decision but an existential confrontation with the groundlessness of existence. When policies or nonprofit organizations insist on a ‘zero vision of suicide’, they inadvertently diminish the weight of this confrontation with the creative abyss, trivializing, and infantilizing the profound human struggle by reducing it to a mental health issue that needs technical interventions and social engineering.
Radical human agency
From an existential and non-pathological perspective, the possibility of self-death is not an aberration or a pathological state. It is, in fact, a manifestation of radical human agency. The use of the word ‘radical’ is intentional. Etymologically, the word radical originates from the Latin radix, meaning ‘root’. It refers to something fundamental or foundational. It the context of human agency and self-death, the term radical applies to the profound capacity of self-determination that lies at the root of human existence. As psychoanalyst and philosopher Erich Fromm says, ‘human existence and freedom are from the beginning inseparable. Freedom is here used not in its positive sense of “freedom to” but in its negative sense of “freedom from”, namely freedom from instinctual determination of his [humans] actions’ (Fromm, 1994, 40, sic, emphasis added). Thus, this agency extends also to the ultimate decision, the power to override the most powerful of all instincts, namely, the instinct of self-preservation, to extinguish the light of one’s of existence. As creatures of the possible, we possess a terrifying freedom that also includes the radical possibility of rejecting existence altogether. In this sense, self-death symbolizes the radical manifestation of human freedom, highlighting not only our ability of self-creation but also to destroy it. The radical nature of this freedom brings into sharp relief the tension between life’s possibilities and the existential abyss that the possibility of self-death opens.
To honour the agency of individuals who contemplate or carry out self-death is to acknowledge that life, at its core, is filled with moments of existential decision-making. The notion that we can fully eradicate self-death through implementing a "zero vision" policy presupposes that every human life can be neatly contained within systems of prevention that eliminate the impulse for such an act. This tends to negate the profound freedom each person has to define the terms of their existence, including the possibility of choosing its end.
The inherent uncertainty of living
Life, as for humans, is inherently uncertain. We move through it without metaphysical guarantees, not knowing what the next day will bring. This uncertainty is at once a source of anxiety and a condition of possibility. It is precisely because life is uncertain and because it can end at any moment that we are compelled to act, to create, and to create meaning in the terrifying silence of the universe.
However, the zero vision seeks to impose a kind of deterministic certainty upon human existence. It envisions a world where the conditions leading to self-death are fully controlled or eradicated, an omnipotent utopian vision in which every human can be saved from their own potential despair and freedom of self-annihilation. Yet such a vision ignores the fact that much of life’s complexity stems from its inherent unpredictability. That is to say, to live is to dwell in uncertainty, to navigate the existential tension between hope and despair. The idea that we can reduce the risk of self-death to zero misunderstands the nature of human existence, which cannot be fully contained by external measures and technical and medical interventions.
The dangers of zero vision
While the intention behind the zero vision is undoubtedly compassionate, it contains within it a dangerous negation of the unique human—that is, our ontological unfinishedness as creates who are incessantly hurling towards an open future. When we attempt to prevent all self-deaths, we risk moral as well as medical paternalism, treating individuals as though they are incapable of making decisions about their own lives, regardless of their reasons. More insidiously, we begin to pathologize existential despair itself, labelling it as something that must always be fixed or chemically cured. In doing so, we tend to downplay the reality of suffering and the confrontation with anguish and the potential collapse of meaning, that are part of the human condition.
Policies that aspire to eliminate self-deaths entirely also risk creating a world where the responsibility for living or dying is handed over to institutions, medical professionals, and societal norms. In this framework, individuals are persuaded to defer their own judgment to external authorities, who claim to know what is best for them. This undermines personal agency and the deeply personal nature of existential crises, where the choice of whether or not to continue living is often tied to questions of meaning, values, and autonomy. Moreover, a zero vision may paradoxically silence those who are suffering. In a world where self-death is framed as an absolute failure of the system or an effect of a pathological condition, those contemplating it might feel that their own struggles are invalid or unacceptable. Instead of being encouraged to speak about their pain openly, they may feel pressured to suppress or hide their suffering in order to conform to societal ideals of mental health and well-being. This can lead to an even deeper despair for those who need empathy and understanding, not interventionist and paternalistic rescue.
Epistemic anarchism
At this point, the theory of epistemic anarchism proves fruitful. This vision challenges the notion of a monoscientific method, specifically, the view that any single perspective or approach can serve as an Archimedean point. On the contrary, the theory promotes an epistemic pluralism on human knowledge production. In considering death wishes, this approach, allows for the exploration of new understandings regarding the construction of death wishes and choices about death and living. In other words, death-wishes and the decision to end one’s life are ascribed different reasons and meanings, varying from individual to individual and their respective worldviews or myths. Hence, any attempt to reduce this unique capacity to monocausal explanations represents an epistemic error, leading to epistemic violence.
Farhan Shah: "Policies that aspire to eliminate self-deaths entirely also risk creating a world where the responsibility for living or dying is handed over to institutions, medical professionals, and societal norms. In this framework, individuals are persuaded to defer their own judgment to external authorities, who claim to know what is best for them."
From the perspective of epistemic anarchism, death-wishes cannot be reduced to a monoetiological explanatory model. Rather, it is important to safeguard a plurality of perspectives without succumbing to epistemic totalization. An anarchistic approach, for instance, regards death-wishes as an expression of a search for meaning, or lack thereof, an existential choice, or a way of expressing (political) resistance when confronted with oppression and violence. It is there crucial to recognise the complexity by avoiding the unilateral and reductionist pathologization of death-wishes, and instead to recognise that these may have legitimate, diverse reasons that vary across individuals, challenging our unspoken assumptions about the notion of normalcy, which itself is a social construction, thus perpetually unstable.
By applying an epistemic anarchist perspective, we can approach death-wishes with epistemic openness and humility, incorporating multiple frames of understanding and epistemologies beyond the Eurocentric one, which prioritizes pathologization, psychologization, and the corresponding pharmacological treatment modalities as something monolithic. This entails recognising the individual’s (epistemic) agency and their fundamental right to self-determination, which also includes self-destructive choices. An important prerequisite for sustainable and viable support services is the development of services and support systems that reflect the cultural pluralization and diversity of our societies. Thus, this anarchistic perspective can contribute to a much-needed humanization of future support services, with a cultural sensitivity in an increasingly pluralized society, avoiding the imposition of predetermined treatment methods and narratives on either practitioners or individuals living through crises and existential breakdowns.
Towards an existentially and a non-pathological informed approach
A more existentially and non-pathological informed approach to death-wishes and self-death would recognize the fundamental tension between the desire to protect life and the respect for individual autonomy. Instead of seeking to eliminate self-deaths altogether, we should aim for a deeper engagement with the complexities of human existence—acknowledging that despair, suffering, and even the contemplation of self-death as a possibility are part of what it means to be human and not pathological states in need of biomedical interventions.
Such an approach would not glorify or romanticize our self-destructive capacity, but would recognize that, for some, it may emerge as a genuine existential option, an outcome of a life lived in freedom and in confrontation with the radical openness of existence. As an implication of the abovementioned, we must create spaces where conversations about death-wishes can occur without fear of moral condemnation or clinical reductionism, spaces where the fullness of human possibilities, both its constructive as well as destructive ones, can be recognised for what they are: human, all too human.
The existential response to the ‘zero vision of suicide’ calls for a more profound respect for the radical unfinished character of human existence. Rather than striving for an ideological omnipotence, we should accept the inherent ambiguities, and the indeterminacy of existence, where agency, incompleteness, and uncertainty will always play central roles. By doing so, we can honour the human condition as incessantly in question, including its most difficult choices, with compassion, humility, and a genuine respect for individual autonomy – even its most terrifying expressions.
References
Fromm, Erich. (1994). Escape from Freedom. Holt Paperbacks; First Edition.